By James Zike
8 March 2013
 |
| A Treatise of Human Nature or Project Gutenburg ebook |
Hume
demonstrated that certain common understandings about objects in the world are
not correct and amount to nothing more than “fictional” accounts, but with his
ontological statements, he did not intend to answer any metaphysical questions. That is to say, that Hume’s use of the term
“fiction” did not imply falsity or impossibility. A careful understanding of how he organized
his system of knowledge based on empirical means might place his fictions back
into the realm of metaphysical possibilities in a way that preserves how he
used them throughout his works.
I.
Perceptions, Impressions and
Ideas
According
to Hume, the mind perceives two types of things, impressions/sensations and
ideas, and all that we can be aware of are ultimately objects of mental
perception.[1] The two types of perceptions, Hume thinks, can
be intuitively distinguished between “thinking and feeling”, and varying in “degrees
of force and liveliness, which they strike upon the mind”.[2] The implication of a mind being the “place”
or space where perceptions are processed into consciousness sets up a picture
similar to that of the Rationalists’ position except that the only “privilege”
that could be said that Hume grants is that sensations are livelier than
anything that follows from them. This is
the key difference between Hume’s view and the in-vogue Rationalism of the time,
because many Rationalists thought that reason and intuition were in a
privileged position over sensation.[3]
The
reason for Hume’s special emphasis on impressions is that they are the
“sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the
soul”; the impression is the first contact that a mind has with anything—not
just the outside world, but with itself as well.[4] In Hume’s view, if there is to be knowledge
gained about anything, the impressions must be the foundation of that knowledge. Whenever philosophers attempt to show an idea
is not innate, the attempt demonstrates that the senses perceive the object or
the memory recalls a previous experience; all simple concepts are first present
in the impressions, and then are copied into ideas that represent the impressions.[5] Although Hume never referred to it this way,
it is now known as the “Copy Principle”, and it is one of the core concepts of
Hume’s system.[6]
By
means of the Copy Principle, sensations and impressions become ideas in the
mind, exactly as they are except slightly less vivid or forceful than
impressions; the weakening does not change the content. Under normal circumstances, Hume thinks that
these ideas are easily distinguishable from impressions because ideas of
objects are only “the faint images” of the impressions from which they were
copied.[7] He admits that at times where the mind is not
in full possession of its faculties, like “in sleep, in a fever, in madness, or
in any very violent emotions”, the two may become confused.[8] He makes several distinctions as to
categories of impressions and ideas according to their properties, but for this
paper, it is only necessary that we examine the simple impression/idea, that
being the object of a basic sensation, e.g. the color gold, or the shape of a
mountain. The link between the simple
ideas copied from impressions give a sort of validity to the mental object, and
that validity exceeds the rational and the intuitive, not because it is somehow
better, but because it is the ultimate foundation of any notion that can be
entertained.
II.
Abstract Ideas and Beliefs
On
the face of that, it may seem true, but it is possible to examine mental
objects that we have never experienced.
Although unlikely that anyone has ever seen a golden mountain, it is
possible to think about such a mental object, but only by joining two ideas,
gold and mountain, together to create a new, abstract idea that lacks the force
of a direct impression of something actually seen; it is weaker than either the
idea of gold or of mountain.[9] Notwithstanding the amalgamation of these
ideas, it is a metaphysical principle that it is possible that any conceivable
object is potentially real, or more strictly speaking, not impossible.[10]
While
it is possible to ponder any abstract idea that might be formed that does not
contain a logical contradiction, it is an entirely different thing to believe
that that new pseudo-object actually exists.
On Hume’s understanding of the difference between impressions and idea
being the force and vivacity of their presence in the mind, and that ideas
recalled from the memory are likewise weakened, it seems odd that from ideas we
could form beliefs. The common
understanding of belief is that of strength of conviction that a mere idea
would not hold.
Hume’s
notion of belief is that a belief is an idea that “feels different from a fictitious idea, that the fancy alone
presents to us”, that it contains a “superior force, or vivacity, or solidity, or steadiness” that “makes them appear of greater importance; infixes
them in the mind; and renders them the governing principles of all our
actions.”[11] It is not that beliefs (in particular beliefs
of matters of fact) are foundationless, far from it, but they are created by
the idea, or group of ideas, which have a particular strength to them that they
gained from their initial impression.[12] It is worthy to note that Hume’s view of the
relationship between beliefs and fictions echoes his previous distinction
between impressions and ideas, specifically that one is “feeling” and the other
is “thinking”.
III.
Necessary Connection and Fiction
One
such abstract idea that is commonly held as a belief is that of causation, the
notion that for every effect, i.e. change in state of affairs, there is some
cause. It is an abstract idea because it
is impossible to gain an impression of some property in all things believed to
be causes that is universal to all of them, and so relations of contiguity and
priority in time are the only ways to explain the nature of causality.[13] However, that is not sufficient alone to
establish that one object is the cause of an effect by those relationships
only. It is conceivable that two objects
(here, I mean this in a general fashion
of mental objects that can include, but do not require, physical objects) in
close proximity (contiguity) and one preceding the other (prior in time) may
not have any actual connection in reality.
Hume addresses this concern by introducing the notion of a necessary
connection between the cause and the effect.[14] The necessary connection is comparable (or
perhaps synonymous) with a power, force or energy, and it is too ambiguous of
an idea to directly survey.[15]
From
our impressions of a single instance, we can only detect that two objects have
changed in some way, and we conclude that one is the cause and the other is the
effect, but we cannot see that power nor can we rationally predict the outcome
of the apparent interaction before the event.[16] “It appears, then, that this idea of a
necessary connexion among events arises from a number of similar instances
which occur in the constant conjunction of these events; nor can that idea ever
be suggested by any one of these instances, surveyed in all possible lights and
positions”.[17] So, when we view a series of sufficiently
similar events, where one object appears to be the cause of an effect, and the
constant conjunction of this pattern appears to us each time, we gain an
intuitive sense that there must be some kind of necessary connection between
the two. We feel that a connection between cause and effect must exist.
However,
our belief in that connection is not from a direct observation of it, but from
reflecting on the impressions we remember, and, furthermore, it is impossible
for us to observe and thus impossible to copy from those observations, any
notion of powers like the necessary connection.[18] Nonetheless, it is not that we are incapable
of holding the notion of it and as an abstract idea it does suggest that it is
possible that it exists, but the question is are we justified in believing that
it does? Hume’s conclusion, which he
carries forward into his greater project, is that it is impossible for us to
justify this notion by empirical evidence or by reason.
All those objects, of which we
call the one cause and the other effect, considered in themselves, are as
distinct and separate from each other, as any two things in nature, nor can we
ever, by the most accurate survey of them, infer the existence of the one from
that of the other. It is only from experience and the observation of their
constant union, that we are able to form this inference; and even after all,
the inference is nothing but the effects of custom on the imagination. We must
not here be content with saying, that the idea of cause and effect arises from
objects constantly united; but must affirm, that it is the very same with the
idea of those objects, and that the necessary connexion is not discovered by a
conclusion of the understanding, but is merely a perception of the mind.
Wherever, therefore, we observe the same union, and wherever the union operates
in the same manner upon the belief and opinion, we have the idea of causes and
necessity….[19]
Custom
of the imagination hardly seems sufficient to establish the existence of a
power. What can possibly allow careful philosophic thinking to entertain this
concept? Considering that natural
science is for all intents, built upon causality and the notion is firmly part
of the common understanding of the world, it would seem ridiculous to claim
that no such concept existed in reality.
Hume even goes as far as saying this kind of reasoning from experience
is so prevalent that as a child in the cradle he was able to use it to improve
himself, but nonetheless a solid, rational argument for it remains elusive.[20] Hume concludes that it is a belief formed
from the constant conjunction of two objects, which make it necessary that we
expect that one effect will follow the assumed cause, but that notion is not
rational per se; it arises from the operation of the imagination, a fiction of
the imagination.[21]
It
is not that a person holding a fiction actually believes something false, but his
concept of beliefs to fiction bears the relative strength of impressions to
ideas. Ideas can never have the same
strength of impressions. Beliefs feel
stronger than ideas because experience has demonstrated reasons to hold them,
or provided no reasons to doubt them.
With all our perceptions, even our strongest beliefs might still be
false, but as long as they are not logically contradictory, they are
metaphysically possible. The near-belief
of necessary connection and causality comes from the same ground, but remains
in a state of doubt because we cannot gain any impression of powers.
When Hume calls a notion fiction, it
is not that he is saying that it is a false belief, or that the concept cannot
be true because anything conceivable is possible. We can only separate these abstract notions
from the set of things that are real via experience, and by experience, we can
see that such a thing as causality is possible.
However, we cannot see the necessary connection that by reason we think
should be there. This fiction never has
the empirical grounds for us to feel that it can be a rational belief.
When Hume calls something a fiction,
he means only that it does not feel like a belief. Upon enquiring into why that is, it becomes
clear that our imagination has filled in gaps in our impressions and in our
reasoning. The works of the imagination still come from the simple impressions
copied into ideas, abstracted as needed, enlivened by repeated impressions and
dulled with time. When we encounter
concepts outside our experience, we may never be able to have a proper
impression, like the taste of an unknown exotic fruit, but our imagination
works in a way that allows us to identify shades of color that we have never
observed.[22] While the type of simple idea of an unseen
hue is not enough to say that fictions as pivotal as cause and effect are
justifiably believable, it does further support the conditional use of
fictions.
At
times, the imagination is the only way that we can arrive at a functional
conclusion, but we can never be rationally justified in a mere thought. If we are to know the taste of pineapple, we
have to taste it. Until we can see
powers, we will have to imagine them, and accept that we are likely wrong.
Bibliography
Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Understanding.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
—. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Lennon, Thomas M., and Shannon Dea. "Continental
Rationalism." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by
Edward N. Zalta. Fall 2012. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/continental-rationalism/
(accessed March 2, 2013).
Morris, William Edward. "David Hume." The
Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy. Edited by Edward N. Zalta. Spring
2013. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/hume/ (accessed March
2, 2013).
[1] David Hume, A Treatise of Human Understanding, 1.1.1 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000), Pg. 7.
[2] Hume, Treatise 1.1.1, Pg. 7.
[3] Thomas M. Lennon, and Shannon Dea, "Continental
Rationalism", The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2012 Edition), ed. Edward N.
Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/continental-rationalism/
(accessed March 2, 2013).
[4] Hume, Treatise 1.1.1, Pg. 7.
[5] Hume, Treatise 1.1.7-12, Pgs. 9-10.
[6] William
Edward Morris, "David Hume", The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013 Edition), ed. Edward N.
Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/hume/ (accessed March 2, 2013).
[7] Hume, Treatise 1.1.1, Pg. 7.
[8] Hume, Treatise 1.1.1, Pg. 7.
[9] David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 2.5 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999), Pg. 97.
[10] Hume, Treatise 1.2.2.8, Pg. 26.
[11] Hume, Treatise 1.3.7.7, Pg. 68.
[12] Hume, Enquiry, 5.1.8, Pg. 123.
[13] Hume, Treatise 1.3.2.5-6, Pgs. 53-54.
[14] Hume, Treatise 1.3.2.11, Pg. 55.
[15] Hume, Enquiry, 7.1.3, Pg. 135.
[16] Hume, Enquiry, 7.2.26-27, Pg. 144.
[17] Hume, Enquiry, 7.2.28, Pg. 144-145.
[18] Hume, Enquiry, 7.1.8-15, Pg. 136-9.
[19] Hume, Treatise 2.3.1.16, Pg. 261.
[20] Hume, Enquiry 4.2.23, Pg. 118.
[21] Hume, Enquiry, 5.1.8-5.2.10, Pg. 123-4.
[22] Hume, Treatise 1.1.1.10, Pg. 10.
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