Media Strategies: al-Qaeda and ISIS in Comparison

          On December 8, 2014 the media was abuzz with the news that top al-Qaeda commander Nasr bin Ali al-Ansi had denounced recent propaganda released by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The videos that al-Ansi was referring to graphically showed beheadings and other violent acts that quickly became associated with the relatively new independent group. Al-Ansi stated that the “[f]ilming and promoting of it [beheadings] among people in the name of Islam and Jihad is a big mistake and not acceptable whatever the justifications are… This is very barbaric.”¹ This was not the first time that al-Qaeda had publicly decried the actions of ISIS. Harith al-Nadhari, a Shariah law scholar with al-Qaeda in Yemen, condemned the discord ISIS had stirred up between jihadi groups in Syria, and their attempts to claim influence over other Middle Eastern and North African areas.² Both al-Ansi and al-Nadhari claimed al-Qaeda responsibility for the attack on Charlie Hebdo on January 7, 2015, which left 12 dead.³ From an outsider's perspective, it seems odd, if not hypocritical, that al-Qaeda would call the violent actions of ISIS “barbaric” and less than a month later order an attack on an a satirical news magazine.

Al-Ansi and al-Nadhari

          It might be tempting to believe that their own twisted sense of justice and morality had blinded them to the brutality of their own actions, while allowing them a cognitive dissonance to condemn ISIS propaganda. That would ignore the long-time connection between the two organizations, as ISIS had been the “front group” for al-Qaeda in Iraq for some time, and had carried out numinous attacks, including suicide bombings of mosques, even before the US troop withdrawal at the end of 2011.⁴ The highly-coordinated sectarian violence that has plagued Iraq for years was instigated by ISIS under the command of al-Qaeda.⁵ The fact that al-Qaeda and their affiliated groups have been well-known for their violence makes it highly unlikely that al-Ansi and al-Nadhari's protests of ISIS are related to the ethics of using extreme brutality or generating strife in the Muslim world. Both tactics are expected from al-Qaeda.

          From an Historical perspective, the best possible way to understand the motivations of al-Qaeda and ISIS would be to analyze the internal communications of both groups, the conversations between them, and the personal recollections/oral histories and documents of key personnel. Unfortunately, given that they are both highly wanted, and downright hated by a number of world powers, this kind of insider perspective will likely never materialize. In many ways this is similar to the long-distant past, histories of commoners, and individuals living on the fringes of societies or collectives, as there is little in the way of surviving or recorded evidence. To assess this situation will require a bit of Copernican revolution, turning the evidence that is available on its head and compelling it to answer questions that it was not asked, and which it might be reluctant to answer, by following the “tracks” of people and events left in history.⁶ Since this investigation is one where direct evidence of the exact question will not be forthcoming, an alternative explanation might be found in the self-representations of the two groups. How do al-Qaeda and the Islamic State use media? What are the similarities and differences in their self-created narratives? How does the use of brutality factor into their self-image?

How does al-Qaeda use media?

Recruitment

Samir Khan

          A major objective of al-Qaeda's use of media is to recruit new members for terrorist attacks that will likely result in their deaths for “Muslim piety and heavenly reward.”⁷ Since al-Qaeda does not have a standing army, “it must continually recruit, and to recruit, it must inspire what are often isolated individuals or galvanized local groups.”⁸ One key message that is projected is that al-Qaeda is fighting for Muslim civilization against the West in ways that are marketed “to bored young men, in search of meaning and adventure.”⁹ One such appeal is a six-page article in the Spring '14 issue of Inspire magazine, in which the former editor of the al-Qaeda magazine, Samir Khan, who was an American convert previously killed by a US drone strike in Yemen, recounted how he became disenchanted with the average lack of interest in the plight of the Palestinians, and set himself toward fighting for al-Qaeda to establish a caliphate for the protection of the Palestinians.¹⁰ The end of his emotional article is a call to action in the form of a question, “… where is your heart in all this? Are you ready to take that chance … take the chance of dying a 'normal' death, empty of Jihad and sacrifice? … Who is going to stop the Israeli oppression?” ¹¹ Discounting international action, he goes on to offer a false dichotomy that Muslims can either ignore their conscience and be dishonored, or become martyrs. Between the two-page photo of a smiling Khan holding an assault rifle, and the association of him as a hero, the article ties together both meaning and adventure by conjoining what he felt was his calling and the implied action of the visuals offered.

Training

Inspire, Spring 2014 Issue 12

          Calls to actions, like Khan's, generally have little effect if they are not also followed up by some means, and with the Internet al-Qaeda has been able to produce and distribute a large amount of terrorist-based training. The range of topics includes poisons, bomb making, infiltration, data security, infantry tactics, and intelligence operations.¹² Under the guise of empowerment of “Muslim youth,” Inspire's section “Open Source Jihad” publishes full instructions on constructing and using a number of weapons, like propane-powered car bombs.¹³ Beyond the construction of the bomb, the magazine offers an analysis of how to use it with the greatest effect, singling out specific targets in multiple countries, times where large crowds might be found, tips to avoid detection, and additional rationale to attack given countries.¹⁴ The training that is offered is centered around al-Qaeda's main objectives, terrorist attacks. Despite the shift toward the “open source jihad,” the tradition of training terrorists in camps outside of their home nations, which gave fairly tight control over target selection and attack methods, can still be seen by the creation of open target lists. The effectiveness might be questioned, as in the last year none of the targets suggested by Inspire have been attacked, but by publishing a list, the terror threat assessment of the events and locations would have likely increased, triggering counter-terrorism operations. Only time will tell how effective the open sourcing of jihad will be.

Legitimation

          Tying their organization to religion not only provides recruitment opportunities by making potential members feel like they are joining a religious order adding value and meaning to their lives, but it also provides a means of legitimacy.¹⁵ As al-Qaeda moved online, much of the previously obscure conversation about the direction of the jihad have become public, and coupled with a growing trend of anti-jihad messages in the Arab media, al-Qaeda has made “public diplomacy” a priority in its political project to sway opinions of not just the already-radicalized, but also the “'median voters' of the Arab Muslim public.”¹⁶ One way to accomplish this is to connect their message to Islam. For example, the magazine ties tawheed, the realization of a concept of divine unity and monotheism, to their terrorism by publishing excerpts from Sheikh Harith An-Nadhary's book The Word of Tawheed, between a testimonial of why one person joined al-Qaeda, and a hostile analysis of statements made to the U.S. Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence.¹⁷ The spacial juxtaposition of these concepts generates, on an emotional level, a feeling that Islam is connected to and is the source of al-Qaeda's actions, while minimizing the Arab media's growing anti-jihad sentiment and overstating the threat felt by the citizens of Western nations.¹⁸

Centralized Media Planning

          Beginning in 1988, al-Qaeda's media network has been putting out a relatively unified message despite the numerous outlets that distribute their products.¹⁹ Between 2005 and 2007 the number of videos produced by As-Sahab, an al-Qaeda production company (only one of thousands of media outlets used by al-Qaeda), grew more than five fold, from 16 to 90, primarily because of Internet distribution, and by that means they have been able to reach more than 500,000 people in 24 hours with a single video.²⁰ Part of the reason for the growth of al-Qaeda's media empire is that the brick-and-mortar Arab media has been less receptive to and more critical of al-Qaeda's message than some might imagine. Al-Jazeera, for instance, despite having a reputation for challenging governmental status quos, has been growing more reluctant to air propaganda, rarely releases the entire video provided to them, and has actively challenged al-Qaeda's goals by offering “a diversity of opinions on the air.”²¹ By building their own media network, and especially by moving their outreach online, they have been able to fuse multiple disputes into one combined message that projects an image of al-Qaeda as “a global insurgency,” which is significantly larger than the organization actually is.²² This enabled groups like the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), upon joining with them, to pick up the al-Qaeda message and brand often word-for-word, or by redistribution of the al-Qaeda literature, in order to legitimize their own actions in their local regions.23

Logo for al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, formerly GSPC

How does ISIS use media?

English / Foreign Recruitment

          “Abandon the lands of shirk²⁴, and come to the land of Islam,” reads a two page photo spread of man in a hoodie, first in an airport, and then standing under an Islamic State flag.²⁵ This youth-aimed imagery is paired with quotes claiming that living in a non-Muslim community corrupts the believer, establishes the otherness of and removes moral duties to any Muslim not living with other Muslims, and sets leaving non-Muslim communities as a religious requirement. Later in the same magazine, under the banner of “Stories From the Land of the Living,” the golden beard and pale skin of Abu Suhayb al-Faransi (a 63 year-old French businessman that allegedly defected to ISIS)²⁶ breaks the racial trend of an overwhelming number of photographs of Arabs.²⁷ Stories From the Land of the Living is an al-Hayat Media Center produced video of al-Faransi apparently talking about either how or why he joined ISIS.²⁸ The video is in French (with Arabic subtitles), but the optics are clear, he first appears walking through the desert, shooting an automatic rifle, reading what is likely meant to be seen as the Qu'ran, walking down a city street, embracing and smiling with another fighter, reciting passages; in short, being fully part of the Islamic State culture. In another al-Hayat produced video, Andre Poulin, a Canadian that joined ISIS and was killed, discusses why he joined ISIS and how others can contribute.²⁹

There is a role for everybody. Every person can contribute something to the Islamic State, as it is obligatory on us. If you can not fight, then you can give money, and if you can not give money, then you can assist in technology, and if you can not assist in technology you can use some other skills. You can even come here and help rebuild the place. If you have knowledge of how to build roads or how to build houses, you can be used here, and you will be very well taken care of.³⁰

Andre Poulin was killed in 2013 fighting for ISIS.
The video of his death has become a recruitment tool.

          Poulin's call to action is for a wide number of skills, not just fighting. The inclusivity of calling anyone to use whatever skills they have for ISIS, paired with the assurance that those who do will be “very well taken care of” highlights a key difference between ISIS and al-Qaeda. Even though the video glorifies his combat death in Syria, the message of martyrdom is secondary to a call for general support building more than just a terrorist organization. Even though al-Faransi is shown firing a weapon, his apparent integration into ISIS shows an acceptance of non-Arab Muslims, and his relative age shows that ISIS is not merely a youth movement. ISIS has cross-generational appeal. The anybody-figure in the hoodie does target a younger demographic, but by setting religious quotes over top of those photos, the broad applicability of the message becomes evident. Al-Qaeda has taken to telling people to stay where they are, learn terrorist skills from their literature, and sacrifice themselves in direct terrorist attacks, which is a religious duty of all Muslims. The propaganda coming out of the Islamic State counters with a religious duty for all Muslims, young or old, able-bodied fighter or skilled technician, Arab or not, to come to ISIS.

Internal Training

          The US media focuses mainly on the “training” videos released by ISIS, which are likely more external propaganda, showing the strength and fortitude of ISIS fighters, and the extreme conditions of training for hand-to-hand combat and obstacle navigation under live-fire.³¹ Some of the videos that have been released show ISIS members engaging in the same kinds of activities and trainings that one might expect from US Special Forces.³² As Anthony Cordesman, Center for Strategic & International Studies, points out in a CNN interview, these kinds of videos are primarily propaganda, as the training in them does not correspond to the types of combat actions they have utilized.³³ However, every major military in the world conducts similar training, the men shown undergoing Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) “A” School are shown doing a number of similarly combat-useless training exercises.³⁴ If we are to consider the ISIS videos to be mere propaganda that does not represent real battlefield abilities, then we have to consider the BUD/S training video to also be mere propaganda.³⁵ This genre of military training and drill videos serves many roles, and propaganda is one of them; however, for ISIS to produce several of these shows that they are marketing themselves not as a terrorist group, but as being equals of any military. Borrowing the “hallmark” tactics of the US Army Rangers³⁶ can be taken to mean that, on a squad to squad level, ISIS might be approaching competency.

          Analyzing the external propaganda can be useful for identifying a self-image common to ISIS, but it tells us little about the conversations that are occurring behind the Black Standard. The permeability of the Internet does give us glimpses of it. Using Ask.fm British members of ISIS answer questions about joining, “including what type of shoes to bring and whether toothbrushes are available.”³⁷ While answering questions of people still in far-distant lands does fall into an external media role, others have produced packages directly targeted at ISIS members themselves. Islam Yaken, and Egyptian personal trainer, joined ISIS and produced a workout video for them.³⁸ While the media focuses on the Violent, the less visually interesting workout video Yaken produced is relegated to a human interest piece. Just as Poulin called for anyone with any skills to use them for ISIS, so Yaken used his knowledge of exercise to promote ISIS. It would be difficult to say that the primary aim of his video was propaganda, as the “training” video discussed by CNN was, but instead it is a form of community building and outreach. ISIS may have a recruiting advantage by means of their military successes, heightened by their skilled use of media propaganda,³⁹ but it would be ill-advised to ignore products like Yaken's. It was the new and social media that played a huge role in binding together the Middle East and North African protests and revolutions in 2010-2011.

Centralized Branding

          ISIS overall communications strategy shows that it has marketed itself as “an agent of change, the true apostle of a sovereign faith, a champion of its own perverse notions of social justice, and a collection of avengers bent on settling accounts for the perceived suffering of others.”⁴⁰ It does this through a wide number of social media sites and consistently communicates the message of their growing strength leading to “inevitable victory.”⁴¹ Their main goals seem to be the security of the Islamic State, and a vast majority of the products released keep that goal in view.⁴² They even seem incredibly self-aware of their own media successes, as demonstrated by John Cantlie's article in Dabiq, where he published comments from former US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, saying that ISIS was unprecedented in terms of organization, training, funding, strategy, brutality, ruthlessness, and use of media.⁴³ Cantlie's interpretation of Hagel's comments was framed in terms of respect, and that might be the case. The Iraqi government has failed to secure their own telecommunications infrastructure, while ISIS has cut the Republic of Iraq's Internet traffic by a third making it difficult for governmental officials to get their own messages out to their own people, but ISIS continues to push its messages out internationally.⁴⁴ Their messages of impending victory in Syria and Iraq are well-served by their demonstrated media abilities, physical victories, and the “respectful” acknowledgment of them as a real threat by US officials.

Individual Bragging

          Much of the online presence of ISIS comes from the boots-on-the-ground fighters via social media. This strategy, while very effective in spreading a message quickly, through a myriad of channels that are difficult to control, also comes with a great number of risks. A video showing a man having his hand cut off by ISIS was never supposed to happen, much less to be distributed, because images of “ISIS militants drenched in the blood of Muslims and other innocents is likely to backfire.”⁴⁵ Nonetheless it was filmed, and released into the World Wide Web. Western recruits seem to be susceptible to online bragging as well, like William Hasmo Clinic, aka Abu Abdullah al-Britani, a British man that joined ISIS. Clinic bragged on Ask.fm that “Allah” and “wrist exercises” made it easy to behead.⁴⁶ Another risk that they face is the inadvertent leaking of mission-critical and force protection information. Recently, this has prompted ISIS leadership to publish a set of rules intended to plug up those leaks by informing ISIS members that they ought not to publish a number of things including the locations of their bases, the tactics they employ, and pictures that have embedded locations.⁴⁷ While the Western media might poke some fun at this seemingly obvious oversight, they are overlooking the fact that the US Military has to continually train servicemembers and their families on the exact same issues, and lays down very similar rules.⁴⁸ The leadership of ISIS had taken significant precautions to protect themselves, using couriers for official communications, thereby reducing the organization’s vulnerability to cyber-warfare.⁴⁹ Between the wrong information leaking to their enemies, and the wrong message being sent out, it seems that ISIS's social media strategy might be flawed, but their success to date has been reliant on this volatile and rapidly changing online environment. Only in the last few months, as they have been meeting with fewer battlefield successes, has it become much of an issue, although ISIS leadership seems to already be sensitive about online security.

Comparison

          Both ISIS and al-Qaeda actively use the Internet to recruit, but the intentions of the two groups differ significantly. ISIS is attempting to build not only an army, but a society under their own caliphate. Al-Qaeda is looking to produce terrorists that are willing to martyr themselves, and as such, they focus on glorifying the sacrifice, conflating their agendas with Islamic beliefs, and making jihad look and feel like being part of an exciting and important battle of civilizations. ISIS uses a similar narrative for much of their recruitment, except that they do not emphasize the necessity of martyrdom nearly as much. Instead, they re-brand fighters that have been killed as heroes, and use those deaths as the means of recruiting any Muslim regardless of fighting skills. The inclusive, non-self-death centered message of ISIS seems to be quite effective, for the time being.

          Both organizations conduct training, and they use media to present some of that material even across international boarders. Al-Qaeda's “open source jihad” focuses their training on the manufacture and deployment of weapons. The “come be a part” mentality of ISIS allows them to produce training materials based on the skills the individuals that join bring with them. From the “training” films most discussed in the Western media we can learn very little about their actual capabilities, but the image they are attempting to project is directly in line with the established narratives of a nation-state's military training and drill trope-filled videos.

          The use of the Qu'ran is central to both organizations. Al-Qaeda reinterprets specific verses in order to play up martyrdom. ISIS uses it to boost their recruitment. Again, this difference is likely due to their organizational goals. It would be unsurprising if ISIS took up a line similar to al-Qaeda, if their goals shifted away from the security of their own “state” to attacking international targets. As it is now, al-Qaeda seems more concerned with justifying themselves to the median citizen of the Arab world, and ISIS seems unconcerned with that goal.

          The nearly 30 years that al-Qaeda has been operating a media network has given them a well-established media plan. They are capable of adapting to new technologies, and their online presence has launched them into a golden era for their mass communications. However, the Arab news media has become less willing to cooperate with their propaganda efforts. ISIS has embraced an inherently unstable communications strategy of using their own members' social media presence as a major factor in their distribution. They are able to make their messages go viral in a way that makes governmental intervention difficult. They are aware of their own online footprint, and it helps spread their brand as the “inevitable” victors. Since their caliphate is dependent on their army-provided security, their army is dependent on recruits, their reciting efforts are through their media (which is highly impacted by the external perceptions of them), and the world's perception of them is based on what they and their army releases online, they have made themselves into the tail that wags the dog.

          As long as they can keep the ISIS brand consistent, then they can play a dangerous game with the international media. The more attention the West gives them, the more influence they can gain. The major weakness in this plan comes from the same thing that gives it strength. If they lose control of the main optics that are making it to international distribution, then their image as champions and avengers can quickly become ISIS as aggressors against other faithful Muslims, ISIS as an oppressor. The online bragging of individuals has the possibility of doing significant harm to their brand, but has an even greater physical risk if their members are not tech-savvy enough to disable geographical tags on photos they post, or are not thinking of operational security when they tweet about their actions and movements.

Conclusion

          The differences in media strategies between ISIS and al-Qaeda can be attributed to their organizational goals. The brutality demonstrated by ISIS was just as big a mistake as al-Ansi likely thought it was, and there is a good chance that the ISIS leadership was aware of that. It is not that either group can be photographed without being covered in blood, but that the blood of Muslims and innocents causes a major public affairs crisis. Whatever interpretation of the rift between these groups is used, they now exist in direct competition for recruits. This competition plays out on the world-stage of international media attention. It is conceivable that al-Ansi and al-Nadhari took advantage of an opportunity to push their old associates-turned-rivals down by publicly decrying their actions. It negatively impacts ISIS's public image, while supporting their own legitimacy narrative. Nonetheless, it does not represent a serious difference in either organization's willingness or ability to engage in brutality. During the Iraqi war both organizations bathed in Muslim and innocent blood, a narrative the Western or the Arab media isn't likely to soon forget.

Limitations of this Study and Further Studies

          The two main limitations of this study are interrelated, a language barrier, and the difficulties inherent in studying a group by external observations. Much of the primary source materials that might have shed a greater light on this topic are either in a language that I do not speak, or they are not accessible, possibly do not exist yet, and perhaps they never will. As an aside and an acknowledgment of a further limitation on this and future studies, I would recommend that veterans of the US Military not currently employed by the government in counter-terrorism or counter-espionage (those with a governmentally recognized reason to be accessing terrorist publications), should avoid taking up this study. There is a significant body of evidence, post-Timothy McVeigh and Charles Whitman, that veterans are assessed by the government as having a terrorism and/or violent crime risk factor associated with them. Accessing terrorist literature, even for scholastic research, may have a severely negative impact on the individual. While this may seem like an irrational fear, the US government has a long history of extreme hostility to military veterans they assess as threats, far more so than against the civilian population.

          

          Without a significant body of insider knowledge, external observations are relegated to abductive reasoning, which can not guarantee that even if all of the observations are true, that the offered solution or explanation is true. All conclusions are based on a subjective interpretation drawn from a limited understanding from likely flawed and necessarily incomplete observations (because this period of History is ongoing). Given an adequate amount of time for all (surviving) collectives to normalize meanings attached to relics and memories, an Historical interpretation will give a much better understanding of the events of today. Nonetheless, given the evidence I was able to find, at the current time, this seems like the most reasonable explanation to me.

          Other than waiting the 40-50 years it will likely take before a sufficient body of internal documents is released into archives, a follow-up study should be conducted by researchers that are fluent in multiple languages, including but not limited to Arabic, French, Russian, and English because of the international nature of this topic and the multilingual nature of the evidence. While interpretation of evidence is the product of scholars, the collection of evidence is of paramount concern when attempting to study groups that are secretive or a recognized enemy of the researcher's home nation. An interdisciplinary approach would likely produce the best results, with a focus on Media Studies and Strategic Communications, Islamic Studies, Terrorism and Security Studies, and MENA Studies. Until ISIS and al-Qaeda are either removed from current events, or have stabilized to the point that they establish archives and/or scholarly investigation, I do not think this topic can be adequately studied by historians, but future historians will greatly benefit from the work of other Humanities scholars.

Notes

1 “Top Commander of al Qaeda in Yemen: Beheadings are 'Barbaric',” CBSNews.com, December 8, 2014, <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/top-commander-of-al-qaeda-in-yemen-beheadings-are-barbaric/>.

2 Mike Brunker, “War of Words Between al Qaeda and ISIS Continues With Scholar's Smackdown,” NBCNews.com, November 21, 2014, <http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/war-words-between-al-qaeda-isis-continues-scholars-smackdown-n253676>.

3 “Al-Qaeda in Yemen Claims Charlie Hebdo Attack,” Al Jazeera.com, January 14, 2015,<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2015/01/al-qaeda-yemen-charlie-hebdo-paris-attacks-201511410323361511.html>.

4 “Deaths in Iraqi Mosque Suicide Blast,” Al Jazeera.com, April 28, 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/04/2011428191654702900.html.

5 “Car Bombs Target Shia Pilgrims in Baghdad,” Al Jazeera.com, June 16, 2012,<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/06/201261695010638386.html>.

6 This is part of the favored methodology and historiography of the French Annales School, as presented by Marc Bloch, The Historian's Craft, 1949.

7 Paul Baines and Nicholas O'Shaughnessy, “Al-Qaeda Messaging Evolution and Positioning, 1998-2008: Propaganda Analysis Revisited,” Public Relations Inquiry, Vol. 3(2), 163-191, PDF available from Sage Journals pri.sagepub.com, 164.

8 Baines, 167.

9 Baines, 164-5.

10 Samir Khan, “Palestine: Betrayal of Human Conscience,” Inspire, Spring 2014 Issue 12, (Al-Qeada Organization in the Arabian Peninsula), 20-5. Please note that as a veteran of the U.S. military, it is not advisable for me to access a significant amount of terrorist literature. As such, I have made a decision to limit al-Qaeda and Islamic State produced materials in this article. These are meant to be representational of a larger body of work, and illustrative of the points made by other scholars. If it was not so great a risk for me, I would have preferred to draw most of my material from primary sources.

11 Khan, 25.

12 Philip Seib, “The Al-Qaeda Media Machine,” Military Review, May/June 2008, Vol. 88 Issue 3, 74-80, available from EBSCO Host, 76.

13 AQ Chef, “Car Bombs Inside America,” Inspire, Spring 2014 Issue 12, (Al-Qeada Organization in the Arabian Peninsula), 64-69.

14 AQ Chef, “Car-Bomb: Field Data,” Inspire, Spring 2014 Issue 12, (Al-Qeada Organization in the Arabian Peninsula), 70-71.

15 Baines, 168.

16 Marc Lynch, “Al“Al-Qaeda's Media Strategies,” The National Interest, Spring 2008 No. 83, Center for the National Interest, 50-56, available from JSTOR.com, 51-6.

17 Sheikh Harith An-Nabhary, “Conditions of the Word of Tawheed,” Inspire, Spring 2014 Issue 12, (Al-Qeada Organization in the Arabian Peninsula), 34-5.

18 Both the preceding article “Why Did I Choose Al Qaeda?” and the following, “24/7 Terrorism,” presume that the “enemies of Allah” are “terrified” by al-Qaeda, and misconstrue a tired Rightist argument for counter-terrorism funding as evidence of great and general fear among Americans.

19 Seib, 74-5.

20 Seib, 74-5.

21 Lynch, 52-3.

22 Baines, 167.

23 Manuel Torres Soriano, “The Road to Media Jihad: The Propaganda Actions of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” Terrorism and Political Violence, (Sevilla, Spain: Pablo de Olavide University Press, 2010), 72-88.

24 Shirk can roughly be translated as polytheism, and is set in opposition to tawheed/tawhid, which can roughly be translated monotheism. There is a deeper implication in these two words, because tawheed also connotes an element of divine truth. So the shirk / tawheed dichotomy also implies wrongness / rightness. Definitions from “First Greater Sin: Shirk (Polytheism),” al-islam.org, (Ahlul Bayt Digital Islamic Library Project), accessed May 10, 2015, <http://www.al-islam.org/greater-sins-volume-1-ayatullah-sayyid-abdul-husayn-dastghaib-shirazi/first-greater-sin-shirk#tawhid-and-shirk-acts-allah-swt>.

25 Dabiq, Issue 8, (Alhayat Media Center), 28-9.

26 “French Senior Jihadist Joins IS,” LiveLeak.com, digital photograph and cutline, August 17, 2014, accessed May 10, 2015, <http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=67c_1408271141>.

27 Dabiq, 63.

28 Stories From the Land of the Living: Abu Suhayb al-Faransi, al-Hayat Media Center, video, c.March, 2015, available on Jihadology.net, accessed May 10, 2015, <http://jihadology.net/2015/03/07/al-%E1%B8%A5ayat-media-center-presents-a-new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-stories-from-the-land-of-the-living-abu-%E1%B9%A3u%E1%B8%A5ayb-al-faransi/>. Given the shot selection during the Voice Over Video sections of his monolog, specifically the shot of a plane taking off, I'm led to believe that he is talking about his decisions to leave France and join ISIS.

29 “A Canadian's Pitch for ISIS,” New York Times (nytimes.com), July 16, 2014, accessed May 10, 2015, <http://www.nytimes.com/video/world/middleeast/100000003001205/a-canadians-pitch-for-isis.html?action=click&gtype=vhs&version=vhs-heading&module=vhs&region=title-area>.

30 “A Canadian's Pitch for ISIS,” 00:59-01:26.

31 “ISIS Training Video Revealed,” CNN via Youtube.com, October 13, 2014, accessed May 10, 2015, <https://youtu.be/Kji6Jnuj1XY>.

32 Compare the following video segments: “Propaganda Video Claims to Show ISIS's 'Workout Program',” Dailymail.co.uk, n.d., accessed May 10, 2015, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/video/news/video-1100813/Propaganda-video-purports-ISISs-workout-program.html>, 00:44-00:51; United States Navy, BUD/S Class 224 Video, (San Deigo, Ca.), via US Military Videos & Photos Youtube.com, April 17, 2014, accessed May 10, 2015, <https://youtu.be/aj4GOFx5nOE>, 02:03-03:00.

33 “ISIS Training Video Revealed,” 00:28-00:50.

34 United States Navy.

35 Admittedly, this now outdated video might be called recruiting propaganda, but it was mainly targeted to an internal audience, primarily limited to United States Navy's Recruit Training Command, Great Lakes, Il., during the late 1990s to the early 2000s. In 1998, this and a handful of similar videos played on repeat every time I was in the Mess Hall at Basic Training. My wife, former Aviation Structural Mechanic Second Class, Lindsay Zike, USN, recalls the same video playing while she was there in 2002.

36 “ISIS Training Video Revealed,” 00:58-01:36.

37 Scott Shane and Ben Hubbard, “ISIS Displaying a Deft Command of Varied Media,” The New York Times, (New York), nytimes.com, August 30, 2014, accessed May 10, 2015, <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/31/world/middleeast/isis-displaying-a-deft-command-of-varied-media.html>.

38 “Three Friends, One Jihadi,” New York Times (nytimes.com), Febuary 18, 2014, accessed May 10, 2015, <http://www.nytimes.com/video/world/middleeast/100000003517767/fit-for-isis.html>.

39 W. Andrew Terrill, “Confronting the 'Islamic State': Understanding the Strengths and Vulnerabilities of ISIS,” Parameters, Vol. 44 Issue 3 (Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College), 19.

40 James Farwell, “The Media Strategy of ISIS,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 56 Issue 6, 2014, 49-50.

41 Farwell, 50.

42 Shane.

43 John Cantlie, “Paradigm Shift,” Dabiq, 64.

44 Farwell, 52.

45 Farwell, 51-2.

46 Anthony Bond, “British ISIS Jihadist Who Bragged About Beheading Enemies is 'Killed During Battle in Syria',” Mirror.co.uk, November 4, 2014, accessed May 10, 2015, <http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/british-isis-jihadist-who-bragged-4564840>.

47 Tom Wyke, “Carless Tweets Cost Jihadis: ISIS Orders Fighters to Stop Giving Away Their Tactics by Bragging on Soical Media,” Dailymail.co.uk, April 17, 2015, accessed May 10, 2015, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3043193/Careless-tweets-costs-jihadis-ISIS-orders-fighters-stop-giving-away-tactics-bragging-social-media.html>.

48 United States Army, “Soical Media Roundup: 6 Social Media Considerations for Deployed Soldiers and Their Families,” Army.mil, PowerPoint Presentation, November 30, 2011, accessed May 10, 2015, <http://www.arcent.army.mil/u-s-army-social-media-handbook>.

49 Farwell, 52.