On December 8, 2014 the media was abuzz with the news that top al-Qaeda commander Nasr bin Ali al-Ansi had denounced recent propaganda released by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The videos that al-Ansi was referring to graphically showed beheadings and other violent acts that quickly became associated with the relatively new independent group. Al-Ansi stated that the “[f]ilming and promoting of it [beheadings] among people in the name of Islam and Jihad is a big mistake and not acceptable whatever the justifications are… This is very barbaric.”1 This was not the first time that al-Qaeda had publicly decried the actions of ISIS. Harith al-Nadhari, a Shariah law scholar with al-Qaeda in Yemen, condemned the discord ISIS had stirred up between jihadi groups in Syria, and their attempts to claim influence over other Middle Eastern and North African areas.2 Both al-Ansi and al-Nadhari claimed al-Qaeda responsibility for the attack on Charlie Hebdo on January 7, 2015, which left 12 dead.3 From an outsider's perspective, it seems odd, if not hypocritical, that al-Qaeda would call the violent actions of ISIS “barbaric” and less than a month later order an attack on an a satirical news magazine.
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| Al-Ansi and al-Nadhari |
It might be tempting to believe that their own twisted sense of justice and morality had blinded them to the brutality of their own actions, while allowing them a cognitive dissonance to condemn ISIS propaganda. That would ignore the long-time connection between the two organizations, as ISIS had been the “front group” for al-Qaeda in Iraq for some time, and had carried out numinous attacks, including suicide bombings of mosques, even before the US troop withdrawal at the end of 2011.4 The highly-coordinated sectarian violence that has plagued Iraq for years was instigated by ISIS under the command of al-Qaeda.5 The fact that al-Qaeda and their affiliated groups have been well-known for their violence makes it highly unlikely that al-Ansi and al-Nadhari's protests of ISIS are related to the ethics of using extreme brutality or generating strife in the Muslim world. Both tactics are expected from al-Qaeda.
From an Historical perspective, the best possible way to understand the motivations of al-Qaeda and ISIS would be to analyze the internal communications of both groups, the conversations between them, and the personal recollections/oral histories and documents of key personnel. Unfortunately, given that they are both highly wanted, and downright hated by a number of world powers, this kind of insider perspective will likely never materialize. In many ways this is similar to the long-distant past, histories of commoners, and individuals living on the fringes of societies or collectives, as there is little in the way of surviving or recorded evidence. To assess this situation will require a bit of Copernican revolution, turning the evidence that is available on its head and compelling it to answer questions that it was not asked, and which it might be reluctant to answer, by following the “tracks” of people and events left in history.6 Since this investigation is one where direct evidence of the exact question will not be forthcoming, an alternative explanation might be found in the self-representations of the two groups. How do al-Qaeda and the Islamic State use media? What are the similarities and differences in their self-created narratives? How does the use of brutality factor into their self-image?
