In
this paper I will briefly lay out W. D. Ross' ethical theory, Moral
Pluralism (MP), and apply it to Bernard Williams'
“George the chemist” case in order to
demonstrate how such a theory can resolve moral conflicts.
Moral Pluralism differs from what could be called “moral monism”
in that monism claims that there is a single principle that serves as
an explanation of morality,1
but pluralism claims there is a collection of principles where none
of them are more basic or fundamental than the rest.2
The major departure between pluralism and monism is that there is no
single justification of morality, the parts of morality, or
the plurality of the moral rules; the basic moral
rules exist together, they cannot be derived from one another, and
they are not grounded on some external principle.3
This
may seem less plausible than
other theories because determinations
in specific cases are usually
deduced from a combination of the basic principle and the derived
duties. Here, we have only a collection of duties with no principle
to make use of in deciding cases. Ross did not find this problematic
because he posited “prima facie” duties
(PFD), a
collection of basic moral duties, and what could be called
“all-things-considered” duties (ATCD),
the duties that are left after careful reflection on “one's duty
proper … [or] one's actual duty.”4
Imagine a driver of a car on
a snowy freeway. The driver
has a large number of legal duties that apply to her at any given
moment: the duty to keep the
car in working order, to use turn signals before
changing lanes, to drive safe
speeds, and to keep her
vehicle under her control in all weather conditions. Failing
at any of one of these might count as being legally blameworthy. If
an emergency vehicle should appear behind her with full lights and
sirens, all the PFDs
of driving are still there,
but her ATCD becomes to move
out of the way.
