The following is a research proposal done as part of a class. I may never do this project, and while my claims here are supported by the evidence that I found, this is far from a completed project, and so can't be taken as a solid argument.
Discussion
of the Topic:
The
topic of this research project is the complex and seemingly
contradictory histories of the Constitutionality of religious
practices inside the United States Government. While the primary
study will be on the federal level, some important state cases, like
the 1927 Scopes trial,
may also be examined. It may seem that until the latter half of the
20th
Century there is a tendency for government to endorse religious
beliefs and practices (Lewis 2002, 78-80). While that is compounded
by the ceremonial and patriotic governmental mentions of “God”
(Newdow v. Rio Linda 2010,
3877), it is a mistake to believe that the Constitution allowed any
level of government to endorse religion, or prefer religion over
non-religious beliefs (Schauer 1996, 444).
The
Supreme Court is part of a long history of deliberation on the First
Amendment, one that finds its beginning with the founding fathers.
Cases often cite non-legislative writings to interpret the intent of
and usage by the founders (see footnote 11, Newdow
v. Rio Linda 2010, 3888). The aim
of this paper is to show how precedents in those cases have shaped
the debate, and make sense out of the seemingly conflicting
decisions. There is an underlying principle of secularism, a promise
of “governmental neutrality toward religion”, that has been
present the entire time (Ledewitz 2011, 3).
Legislators
have passed laws and government officials have set policies that
unduly supported religion, or endorsed religious behaviors in the
government, but when those laws/policies were challenged, they failed
the tests of the Supreme Court (Wallace
v. Jeffree 1985; Abington
School District v. Schempp 1963;
Engel v. Vitale 1962).
Additionally, the free exercise of religion has been at odds with
civil laws. The courts have upheld those laws with the same
stringency shown when striking down laws that endorse religious
activities (Oregon v. Smith 1990).
One
confusing aspect is that the Court seems to rule in favor of
religious freedom in one case and against it later. This might seem
arbitrary, but those decisions, while occasionally biased (Green
2012, 6), are well reasoned, and in combination with the dissenting
opinions, one can map out the principles and the boundaries between
government and religion. This project aims to uncover the “wall of
separation” (Jefferson 1797) from the cultural and legal debris
that hides and confuses the issue.
Proposed
Argument:
The
“God” of the government must, by Constitutional definition, be a
religiously empty concept, not an endorsement or practice of any
religion or religious belief, and the Supreme Court has continually
ruled along those lines. This secularist reading is essential to
maintaining religious freedoms for all, and despite claims from
modern scholars, this was the intended reading of the First Amendment
and is well supported by Supreme Court decisions.
Survey
of Scholarship:
To
illustrate the complexities of Constitutional interpretation, one can
consider the various positions that scholars take, like the two
approaches to the Establishment Clause. The “accommodationist”
view, like that of prominent conservative politicians, looks toward
the original intent of the clause as means to prevent a
state-established religion, and sees no conflict in the government
aiding religion (Miller 1996, 7). The second approach is the
“separationist” view, which holds that there should be a strict
separation between government and religion, which allows no aid from
one to the other (Miller 1996, 8-9).
Robert Miller gives equal
weight to both, implying that they are equally legitimate, and have
the same authority, but the accommodationist view is not found until
the resurgence of Protestantism in 20th
Century (Miller 1996, 7). It is not supported by the writings of the
founding fathers, or the Court's decisions. I will argue that the
intent of the law, in combination with the commentaries of the
founding fathers, and the precedents of the Court, entail a strict
secularist reading of the First Amendment, where support for religion
and government infringement on religious practices must be for a
legitimate civic reason.
That
is not to say that religion is barred from the state, as Bruce
Ledewitz argues is happening, but that legal matters should be
examined form a secular viewpoint. Ledewitz claims that it is
essential for religious and secularists to find a common ground that
does not remove religion completely from the government, but finds
secular meaning in religious messages (Ledewitz 2011, 246-7). One
might have religiously inspired convictions that find a legitimate
secular reason to adopt them as law, the believer may even have a
religious duty to seek such laws, but everyone has a Constitutional
right to advocate for laws in accordance to one's own conscience
(Cuomo 1984, 449).
In
this way, the bounds between religion and state often seem muddled.
Thomas Lewis argues that the 20th
Century's redefinition of public and private spheres has caused
secularism never before seen in the American government (Lewis 2002,
79-80). Like Miller, he has failed to consider, or downplayed the
writing of the founding fathers, like many of Jefferson's works
(among others) that show his attitude about religion and government
(Jefferson 1797).
Steven
Green explores the “school issue” in the late 1800s when the
first public schools were founded as alternatives for private
religious schools (Green 2012, 7-10). He uses that debate to
contextualize the holdings and public backlash that has occurred
since the Court first established authority over the states in the
1940s (Green 2012, 3-8). This suggests that the debate has cultural
foundations that predate the spans examined by Miller and Lewis.
Since the first case to invoke the Religious Clause was in 1947
(Green 2012, 4), I will use Green's work as a model to fill in the
gap between the founding of the nation and the beginning of the
Court's involvement.
This
will require that I demonstrate that Frederick Schauer's argument
that the philosophic foundations for a secularist reading, which
neither systematically supports nor detracts from religious and
non-religious beliefs, is founded on the harm principle; liberty
should only be restricted when it would cause harm to others (Schauer
1996, 309-310; 444-5). The goal is to show that the intellectual
linage of that thought is traceable to the founding fathers, and
establish it as an underpinning to liberty restricting decisions.
Analysis
of Primary Sources:
My
main primary sources are the court cases, which are accessible
through legal libraries, databases like LexisNexis, websites,
document retrieval services, ILL from depositories, and directly from
the courts. They include a wide range of information, and are, in
themselves, works of exquisite legal scholarship.
While
they often offer detailed accounts of how the Court reached a
verdict, it must be noted that the view from the bench cannot be
taken as proof of how things actually were. The Court is in a unique
position to gather evidence in ways that are not available to other
sources. However, the procedural rules that govern admissibility of
evidence create a selection bias for which researchers must
compensate. Each case is mainly focused on answering one narrow
legal question, but in seeking that answer, they pull in a
significant amount of related information.
To
illustrate one source of confusion on the topic, I will use newspaper
articles, and other media reports on the cases to contrast the
decisions with their portrayal to the population. The articles can
be retrieved via the UA Library and associated databases, like
America's Historical Newspapers, Historical Chicago Tribune,
Historical Los Angeles Times, Historical Washington Post, ProQuest,
and others.
An
example of how this would factor into the project would be to
contrast Oregon v. Smith with
the coverage in Marcus Ruth's Washington
Post article.
In Ruth's attempt to convey the essential details of the case, he
neglected to report the complexity of arguments and the depth of
cited precedents, which might make the decision seem less
authoritative than it actually was. Although, in providing analysis
and reactions to the case, he offers researchers a jumping-off point
to further contextualize the case, and find other potential primary
sources, like law professor Michael McConnell, and Steven Shapiro of
the ACLU, both having been quoted in Ruth's article.
Other
primary sources include things like the assertion that the United
Sates is not a Christian nation found in Article 11 of The
Treaty of Tripoli of 1797.
Collections of the founding father's writings about religion and the
government will be used to support the claim that the basic secular
principles were present from the founding of the nation. For
instance, Thomas Jefferson's 1802 letter to the Danbury Baptists,
where he coined the phrase “a wall of separation between Church &
State [sic]”.
Conclusion:
Despite the sea of modern scholarship, this
issue continues to be highly controversial. While this project is
challenging, tracing the history of the underlying principles used by
the courts will provide a deeper understanding of the boundaries
between religion and the government. Taking a strict secularist
reading of the history of the laws and decisions shows that religious
neutrality has supported religious freedom.
Bibliography
Secondary Sources:
Green,
Steven. 2012. The Bible, the School,
and the Constitution: The Clash That Shaped the Modern Church-State
Doctrine. New York: Oxford U.P.
Ledewitz,
Bruce. 2011. Church, State, and the
Crisis in American Secularism.
Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana U.P.
Lewis,
Thomas. 2002. The Bill of Rights.
Pasadena, CA: Salem Press Inc.
Miller,
Robert. 1996. Toward Benevolent
Neutrality: Church, State, and the Supreme Court.
Waco, TX: Markham Press Fund of Baylor U.P.
Schauer,
Frederick. 1996. The Philosophy of
Law: Classic and Contemporary Readings with Commentary.
Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace College Publishers.
Primary
Sources:
Cuomo,
Mario. 1984. “Religious Belief and Public Morality: A Catholic
Governor's Perspective”. Frederick Schauer. 1996 The
Philosophy of Law: Classic and Contemporary Readings with Commentary.
Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace College Publishers.
Garvey,
John. 1993. “The Pope's Submarine”. Frederick Schauer. 1996 The
Philosophy of Law: Classic and Contemporary Readings with Commentary.
Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace College Publishers.
Jefferson,
Thomas. 1802. “Jefferson's Letter to the Danbury Baptists: The
Final Letter, as Sent.” Library of
Congress Information Bulletin June
1998 Vol. 57, No. 6.
Marcus,
Ruth. 1990. “Court: States Can Ban Peyote in Rites: Religious
Freedom Does Not Justify Breaking Valid Law, Scalia Says.” The
Washington Post (1974-Current file).
April 18, 1990. ProQuest.
Tripoli
(Libya). 1797. Treaty of Peace and
Friendship Between the United States of America and the Bey and
Subjects of Tripoli of Barbary. Philadelphia:
United States Treaties. Available from The American Antiquarian
Society and NewsBank Inc.
Court Cases by subject:
These are not the only cases
that should be considered, but cases that established precedents that
have been used, or were otherwise significant. Please note that I am
using the standard legal citation for cases in order to maintain the
information that is presented in that style and to aid retrieval of
the cases.
Free
Exercise
Employment
Division, Oregon Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
School
Prayer
and Devotionals
Abington
School District v. Schempp 374 U.S.
203 (1963).
Engel
v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
Wallace
v. Jeffree 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
Funding
for Private Schools
Everson
v. Board of Education of Ewing Township
330 U.S. 1 (1947).
Lemon
v. Kurtzman 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
Evolution
as a subject
Epperson
v. Arkansas 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
Scopes
v. State 154 Tenn. 105 (1927).
Use
of “God” as Historical/Patriotic/Ceremonial
Aronow
v. United States 432 F.2d 242 (9th
Cir. 1970).
Newdow
v. Rio Linda Union School District
597 F.3d 1007 (9th
Cir. 2010).
No comments:
Post a Comment