Silver Filigree Dog Tags by Lindsay Zike

Lindsay Zike, Collection of Service Dog Tags, Fine and Sterling Silver, 2015 (Private Collection). [Pin on Pinterest]

A simple piece of machine-pressed aluminum, nearly identical to millions of others. A practical solution to a grim problem; just before the turn of the last century it became apparent to the Quartermaster of Identification, Capt. Chaplain Charles C. Pierce, that the fighting in the Philippines had left the Army with too many unidentified fallen. His solution was to outfit each solider with an identity disk made of cheap pressed aluminum. A few years before the US entered the Great War the Army adopted this policy, and with a few minor design changes the modern dog tag came into existence.

Over the years the dog tag has become an icon of the military. In the movies the visual symbolism to indicate that a character was, at any time, associated with the service is the ever-present dog tags around their necks. Personally, a decade after my service ended, I still carry mine with me every day. So associated with the military, the dog tags have also became a symbol of bad-ass-ness; every wannabe, from Justin Bieber to the armchair commandos that answer the call of duty with a controller in their hands have a far nicer set than those in my pocket.

Aeneas The Hero?

          Aeneas, as the primary actor in the first book of Virgil's Aeneid, does not conform to the modern expectations of a hero, but he might also not conform to the expectations of a hero from earlier Greek poetry either. Virgil, writing at the time of Octavian, modeled The Aeneid after Homer's Iliad and Odyssey.¹ However, at such and advanced time in the history of Rome, it is doubtful that anything of the “original” tale survived, if there ever was, indeed, such a story from the Greek tradition. The Aeneid, instead of being an accurate retelling of some legend from time immemorial, is a motivated work of utter fiction that carried a political intention of an emperor and a poet, and as such, Aeneas is the hero that was hoped to bring the Roman Empire back to religion.² Aeneas is a refugee that brings an idealized view of his culture forward into the Rome Empire.

          In both Greek and modern heroic tales, the thing that marks the hero is that they are the primary agent that does, even though they have things that happen to them first, and along the way. Achilles goes to Troy with 50 ships, fights the Trojans, and calls out Hector in order to kill him; Hercules undertakes the twelve labors; Leonidas defends Thermopylae to his last. Likewise, in modern times we set up people, and, far more often, archetypes or professions as heroes based on their actions, real and fictionalized. Firefighters rush into burning buildings, doctors and EMTs save people, soldiers defend nations; specific people noted for their supererogatory actions serve as token examples of heroes, but always for what they do. In Book 1 Aeneas does next to nothing, but much happens to him.

Media Strategies: al-Qaeda and ISIS in Comparison

          On December 8, 2014 the media was abuzz with the news that top al-Qaeda commander Nasr bin Ali al-Ansi had denounced recent propaganda released by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The videos that al-Ansi was referring to graphically showed beheadings and other violent acts that quickly became associated with the relatively new independent group. Al-Ansi stated that the “[f]ilming and promoting of it [beheadings] among people in the name of Islam and Jihad is a big mistake and not acceptable whatever the justifications are… This is very barbaric.”¹ This was not the first time that al-Qaeda had publicly decried the actions of ISIS. Harith al-Nadhari, a Shariah law scholar with al-Qaeda in Yemen, condemned the discord ISIS had stirred up between jihadi groups in Syria, and their attempts to claim influence over other Middle Eastern and North African areas.² Both al-Ansi and al-Nadhari claimed al-Qaeda responsibility for the attack on Charlie Hebdo on January 7, 2015, which left 12 dead.³ From an outsider's perspective, it seems odd, if not hypocritical, that al-Qaeda would call the violent actions of ISIS “barbaric” and less than a month later order an attack on an a satirical news magazine.

Al-Ansi and al-Nadhari

          It might be tempting to believe that their own twisted sense of justice and morality had blinded them to the brutality of their own actions, while allowing them a cognitive dissonance to condemn ISIS propaganda. That would ignore the long-time connection between the two organizations, as ISIS had been the “front group” for al-Qaeda in Iraq for some time, and had carried out numinous attacks, including suicide bombings of mosques, even before the US troop withdrawal at the end of 2011.⁴ The highly-coordinated sectarian violence that has plagued Iraq for years was instigated by ISIS under the command of al-Qaeda.⁵ The fact that al-Qaeda and their affiliated groups have been well-known for their violence makes it highly unlikely that al-Ansi and al-Nadhari's protests of ISIS are related to the ethics of using extreme brutality or generating strife in the Muslim world. Both tactics are expected from al-Qaeda.

          From an Historical perspective, the best possible way to understand the motivations of al-Qaeda and ISIS would be to analyze the internal communications of both groups, the conversations between them, and the personal recollections/oral histories and documents of key personnel. Unfortunately, given that they are both highly wanted, and downright hated by a number of world powers, this kind of insider perspective will likely never materialize. In many ways this is similar to the long-distant past, histories of commoners, and individuals living on the fringes of societies or collectives, as there is little in the way of surviving or recorded evidence. To assess this situation will require a bit of Copernican revolution, turning the evidence that is available on its head and compelling it to answer questions that it was not asked, and which it might be reluctant to answer, by following the “tracks” of people and events left in history.⁶ Since this investigation is one where direct evidence of the exact question will not be forthcoming, an alternative explanation might be found in the self-representations of the two groups. How do al-Qaeda and the Islamic State use media? What are the similarities and differences in their self-created narratives? How does the use of brutality factor into their self-image?

Troops in Transition

Project Statement

          Somewhat unsurprisingly, a comprehensive study of mental-health risks showed that members of the US Armed Forces have a significantly higher likelihood of developing mental illnesses than the general population, with some conditions, like post-traumatic stress disorder, appearing more than a full order of magnitude more often in military members.¹ A 2012 Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) study cautiously stated that 18-22 veterans commit suicide per day.² Although the report is often cited by a number of lawmakers and veterans advocacy groups, decontextualization places a significant portion of the interest on veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts.³ This is further perpetuated by the younger veterans, of which “[o]ne in two veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan wars say they know a fellow service member who attempted or committed suicide.”⁴

          The average age of male veterans that committed suicide between 1999 and 2010 was 59.6 years old, much older than the overall civilian population, and well outside the average age of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.⁵ There is a sharp increase in the percentage of Americans that are veterans from age 55 on, peaking at ages 85-89 with 80 percent of surviving men having served as some point (women of all ages show between 1 to 3 percent).⁶ A lack of sufficient research and reliable statistics has made the topic of veteran suicide difficult to adequately analyze.⁷ The VA dedicated itself to supporting “the safety and well-being of our nation's Veterans of all eras,” and has increased their suicide risk assessments and prevention efforts.⁸ While that is not necessarily a change from previous policies, this is one of the first reports to both identify older veterans as having continuing serious mental health issues and to catch wide-spread attention. Lack of adequate contextualization has generated a narrative that focuses attention on the wrong generations.

          This comes at a time when long-standing Veterans Service Organizations, like the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States of America, are finding the ever-widening generation gap too difficult to cross.⁹ Younger veterans are not joining the ranks of veterans 30-years their senior for a number of reasons, but central to them is a sense that VSOs are out of touch with the needs and desires of the post-9/11 servicemembers. Despite the foundational goals of these groups, to care for both present and future veterans and their families,¹⁰ the older VSOs may be lapsing into irrelevancy as “military personnel have largely been spared from budget cuts … because of the overwhelming public support for the troops.”¹¹

Survivor's Guilt: Problems of Oral Histories of Veterans

          There are cultural expectations shaped as much by mass consumption entertainment as they are by lived experience. The collectives that societies form normalize attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors that are enforced, consciously or otherwise. People that live with the memories of something too far outside of those expectations can find themselves silenced either by trying to speak to ears that refuse to hear, to minds that can not understand, or sometimes with mouths that are unable to express themselves. Military veterans, by the very nature of service, might find themselves on the wrong side of cultural expectations.

          Three veterans returning from World War II gaze out of the nose of a bomber flying to their home town, the rolling countryside slowly becoming more familiar to them as they get closer to home. The Navy Petty Officer Homer Parrish (Harold Russell), demonstrates the use of the hooks that have replaced both of his hands by lighting the cigarettes of the Air Force Lieutenant Fred Derry (Dana Andrews), and Army Sergeant Al Stephenson (Fredric March).¹ After disembarking the three share a cab back to their old lives, or whatever they could make out of them; Homer not able to bring himself to embrace his sweetheart. Al Stephenson, unrecognized by the doorman at his own apartment, surprises his wife and children, but quickly finds out that his kids have grown up significantly, and his wife's social circles have changed. While dealing with mental traumas, Fred attempts to find the woman he married just before he departed, but when he does his marriage quickly sours as they party away the last of his savings. He is reduced to taking up his low paying pre-war job in a drug store, his military experience having no bearing on the civilian world. The film The Best Years of Our Lives might look a bit dated to a modern audience, as the acting and narratives of 1946 were more stylized than today's viewers are used to, but at the time it was praised for its realism.² The basic narrative of returning veterans trying to put their lives back together is made more poignant by the two-Oscar-winning portrayal of Homer by Army veteran Harold Russell (Best Supporting Actor, and a special award for “bringing aid and comfort to disabled veterans through the medium of motion pictures”).³

Conversations About Fear: The Bonus March of 1932

“WARSHIPS AT HAVANA”

“Their Assembling is Favorably Regarded Here.”

          These were headlines from the Evening Star, January 26, 1898.¹ The newspaper lays out the situation as relayed by Consul General Fitzhugh Lee: the United States Armored Cruiser (referred to as a battle ship) USS Maine (ACR-1) had arrived to Havana, Cuba, for a good-will port visit, and the city received them well. Lee anticipated that German, British, and French ships would soon be joining them in the Spanish city, from which he had returned observing no signs of disorder. The intent of the international force was to show the Spanish government, currently contending with Cuban nationalists, that the Maine's visit was well intended.

          Less than a month later the Evening Star would be trying to make sense of the explosion aboard the Maine that destroyed the ship. Headlines like “The Maine Blown Up” sat next to “Officers Puzzled,” and “The Cabinet Confer: Members Discuss the News With the President” that reported the buzz of activity at the White House following the arrival of telegrams.² Included in those were regrets from the Spanish government and assurances that they were not responsible for the explosion. War drums quickly drowned out whatever good will the Maine had intended to convey. One week after the explosion, well before official investigations were complete, newspapers began publishing telegrams and letters of support for war with Spain. In Oklahoma The Wichita Daily Eagle ran an entire column on their front page of offers to serve, requests to the governor for authorization to raise companies of troops, and pledges of armed support to the President.³ By March, Lehigh University students paraded through the town with the slogan “To hell with Spain.”⁴ The phrase, sometimes amended with “Remember the Maine,” morphed quickly into songs and stories (many about children) that appeared around the country.⁵